Erica Galvaz-Dellacruz v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-10-2012 
Erica Galvaz-Dellacruz v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Erica Galvaz-Dellacruz v. Atty Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1021. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1021 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1625 
 ___________ 
 
 ERICA GALVAZ-DELLACRUZ, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A094-241-252) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 9, 2012 
 
 Before:  FISHER, WEIS and BARRY, Circuit 
  
Judges 
(Opinion filed: May 10, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Erica Galvaz-Dellacruz petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) order affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying 
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For 
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the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Galvaz-Dellacruz, a native and citizen of Peru, last entered the United States in 
September 1997.  She was placed in removal proceedings in April 2008, with charges 
under INA § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6), as an alien present in the United States 
without being admitted.  As relief from removal, she applied for withholding of removal 
and relief under CAT, and, in the alternative, voluntary departure.1
 At a hearing before an IJ, Galvaz-Dellacruz testified that, during the years 1985 
through 1990, there were a number of attacks in Peru by the terrorist group, the 
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (“MRTA”).  During one of the attacks in 
1989, the MRTA killed the governor of Tapo, a town in Peru.  Galvaz-Dellacruz testified 
that the MRTA was after her father because he served as the lieutenant governor of Tapo 
during that period.  She also stated that due to their fear of the MRTA, in 1990, her 
parents fled Peru and gave her up for adoption to her grandparents.  Galvaz-Dellacruz 
claimed that her grandparents later sent her to the United States due to the fear of 
terrorists.  She stated she was afraid to return to Peru because the MRTA is still active 
and she believes that she would be targeted due to her father’s former position as 
lieutenant governor. 
 
 Although the IJ found that Galvaz-Dellacruz’s testimony was credible,  the IJ 
denied Galvaz-Dellacruz’s requests for withholding of removal and CAT relief.  The IJ 
                                                 
1 Galvaz-Dellacruz initially applied for cancellation of removal, but was not 
statutorily eligible pursuant to INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
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granted voluntary departure upon posting bond.  Galvaz-Dellacruz appealed to the BIA, 
which dismissed the appeal for essentially the reasons set forth in the IJ’s decision.  The 
BIA concluded that Galvaz-Dellacruz failed to demonstrate past persecution because she 
was never physically harmed in Peru.  She failed to demonstrate a clear probability of 
persecution because the Country Report did not support a finding that the MRTA is an 
ongoing, active terrorist group in Peru.  For the same reasons, the BIA also found Galvaz-
Dellacruz failed to establish that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if she 
returns to Peru.  Because Galvaz-Dellacruz failed to post bond, the BIA did not reinstate 
her voluntary departure period and ordered her removed from the United States to Peru.  
Galvaz-Dellacruz then filed a petition for review.  
We have jurisdiction under INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Where the BIA 
issues a decision on the merits, we review only the BIA’s decision.  However, we will 
look to the IJ’s analysis to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted it.  See 
Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We “will uphold the findings 
of the BIA to the extent that they are supported by reasonable, substantial[,] and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, and will reverse those findings 
only if there is evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude as 
the BIA did.”  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).  Our review of 
legal conclusions is de novo, subject to principles of deference.  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen.
To obtain withholding of removal, Galvaz-Dellacruz must demonstrate that it is 
, 
602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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more likely than not that she will face persecution if she is removed to Peru based on her 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.  
See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434, 438-
39 (3d Cir. 2003).  To make this showing, Galvaz-Dellacruz must demonstrate either past 
persecution or a likelihood of future persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).  A future-
persecution claim requires the applicant to demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution 
and that the fear is objectively reasonable.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  The objective prong requires an applicant to demonstrate that (1) she would 
be “individually singled out for . . . persecution” or (2) “there is a pattern or practice” of 
persecuting similarly situated individuals.  Id.  Persecution does not include all acts that 
our society regards as unfair, unjust, unlawful, or unconstitutional.  Rather, persecution is 
defined as “extreme behavior, including ‘threats to life, confinement, torture, and 
economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.’”  Ahmed 
v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fatin v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Servs., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)).  To obtain CAT relief, Galvaz-
Dellacruz must show that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if removed to 
Peru.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  For an act to constitute torture under the CAT, it 
must cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering.  Auguste v. Ridge
Galvaz-Dellacruz asserts that the BIA erred because there was sufficient evidence 
to conclude that it is more likely than not that she will face persecution if removed to 
, 395 F.3d 123, 
151 (3d Cir. 2005).     
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Peru based on her testimony and corroborating documents.2  We disagree.  A reasonable 
factfinder would not be compelled to find that Galvaz-Dellacruz had suffered past 
persecution or is likely to suffer persecution if removed to Peru.  While she correctly 
notes that physical harm is not a prerequisite to a finding of persecution, see Li v. Att’y 
Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2005), Galvaz-Dellacruz has not demonstrated that the 
MRTA’s behavior constituted a threat to her life or freedom, see Ahmed, 341 F.3d at 
217.  Her testimony and corroborating documents focus on events from 1985 through 
1990, and the Country Report does not support a finding that the MRTA is an ongoing, 
active terrorist group in Peru.  See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citing Kayembe, 334 F.3d at 235, for the proposition that State Department 
country reports are the “most appropriate” and “perhaps best resource on country 
conditions”).  Moreover, her grandmother indicated in a letter that Galvaz-Dellacruz was 
sent to the United States for economic reasons, not for fear of persecution.  See
The BIA's rejection of Galvaz-Dellacruz's CAT claim also finds substantial 
support.  Galvaz-Dellacruz presents her testimony and corroborating documents that 
 R. 149-
50.  Thus, Galvaz-Dellacruz’s fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable.  
We, therefore, conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that 
Galvaz-Dellacruz has failed to show that it is more likely than not that she will face 
persecution if she is removed to Peru. 
                                                 
2 Galvaz-Dellacruz notes that her corroborating documents include a letter from 
her grandmother that stated that in 1989 her grandmother cared for her because her father 
had been threatened by terrorists.  
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discuss her father’s governmental position and the MRTA’s activities from 1985 through 
1990.  For the reasons stated above, this evidence also fails to demonstrate that it is more 
likely that not that she would be tortured if removed to Peru.   
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
